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R E P L Y AKCUJMEI J I 
I 
THE DEFENDANT JORDAN SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
HAVING NO STATUTORY RESPONSIBILITY 
FOR THE REGULATION, MITIGATION OR HANDLING 
OF "HAZARDOUS MATERIALS", IS NOT WITHIN 
THE CLASS OF GOVERNMENTAL AGENCIES FOR WHICH 
IMMTJNTTY FPHM QTTTT w*q CONTEMPLATED 
The Defendant JOPDAN SCHOOI I) STRICT ir. • -;ernmental 
encity rreated ai. 1 • •• ••.
 ; :.. .L . . . :_ : o operate 
a... -u.ister a puU.L__c s-, £h>c;.. sysiL-nlf : u ~ he education of 
children in kindergarten through hi ah - 'ho-: ' "r>x'r ' \I"0 
STATUTE -':^': :i . .,,,,,1. 01 ,egulate 
"hazardous waste" jr s hazaidous materials'' , as such, and is thus 
not withu -.h^  »*-" » - ' -• + - :-• -^  -,, i as 
the Department M Mn - ilonraentai Quality and the Department of 
Health which -in' i n • n* atutorily charged w±ui those 
responsibi1ities, 
i )bviously, tiu.. legislature intended to shield those agencies 
re.q. cue DEQ, the Deuarfrnf-nr of Heah ;' : -«• «-l , - « . . , 
^ x 1 - r ^  o r d i r ~; • ,. <. „ _ i, ;, _L S 
. I--L - r, .jCvjioiai utc j a i d ncT anr-'r.d ' ne grant , of I I T . ; . ; : 7 t o 
e x t e n d . o c i l .- iion l d i q f r ^ r * ' ^ a j y : - ' * 
w a s t e r ' ' j i ^ . [ . . ,e^diaLiui i l a c h n . t s , 
from s u i t L^ i i s c i n c e " a i u s i n g f: m ~ h* daruciaiu <=fr- ri-
i n t e n t i o n a l l y i n f l i rt.^d upon an ~KJ— :— • : ;. 
* "^ '
1
 * . ? a s s e i t i w , . . * -- t i . ^ i u t -.4 c 
e n t i t l e m e n t mrv.j.. i i" s i m '-11 ' ' ^ ^ ^r-^u* ^ e s r f u l 
a r g u m e n t s r a i s e d by OLI. % ; ' ^- f J] --. u • .. n F 
1 
of their limited area of responsibility. 
This Court's decision in the case of Williams vs Board of 
Education, 780 P.2d 818 (Utah Supreme Court 1989)], is authority 
for the proper, common-sense analysis of the scope of 
"governmental immunity". In Williams the school district argued 
that the run-off of stormwaters onto the "downhill" adjoining 
propertyowner was immunized from suit, by reason of the Act, 
because the district was engaged in the "management of 
floodwaters". This hypertechnical argument WAS REJECTED by this 
Court which engaged in a common-sense reading of the Act and 
thereafter wrote: 
We do not need to reach here the question of 
whether the second paragraph of section 63-30-3 
provides "absolute immunity" for the flood control 
activities of governmental entities. That is because 
we hold that defendant's activities in the instant case 
simply do not come within the contemplation of 
paragraph two. . . . Under this standard of review, the 
facts in the record clearly indicate that plaintiff's 
damages from the runoff surface waters which are the 
subject of this action are not the result of 
defendant's "management of flood waters and other 
natural disasters (or] the construction, repair, and 
operation of flood and storm systems." Defendant school 
district has no such statutory responsibility 
We do not believe it was the legislature's intention in 
enacting the 1984 amendment to shield defendant from 
possible liability for damages arising from its 
negligence in the resurfacing of a parking lot, a 
question of fact to be determined on remand. Like 
private property owners, owners of public property must 
exercise reasonable care in controlling surface waiter 
runoff. 
780 P.2d at 820-821. Emphasis added. 
Contrary to the assertions of the DISTRICT, Williams IS a 
"persuasive analogy" (opposing counsel's term, p. 15 of 
APPELLEE'S BRIEF) for the proposition that the Court engage in a 
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common-sense reading AND APPLICATION of the Governmental Immunity 
Act. 
The odors, vapors and gases from the sewer vent pipe are 
legally no different from the run-off waters from the parking 
lot in Williams and for which the public entity may be held 
liable! [Indeed, if there is a difference between the sewer 
gases, odors and vapors and the runoff waters, it is only that in 
the case at bar that the JORDAN SCHOOL DISTRICT has INTENTIONALLY 
ACTED to take those gases, vapors and odors which would 
arguably have remained in the underground sewer line and "vent" 
them into the atmosphere a mere 17 feet away from Plaintiffs' 
residence!] 
As the Williams decision correctly noted in connection with 
"management of flood waters", the Jordan School District in this 
case has NO STATUTORY RESPONSIBILITY to manage "hazardous wastes" 
within the contemplation of the Governmental Immunity Act and 
thus should enjoy no "immunity" from suit for its negligence. 
Essentially similar results were reached by this Court in 
its decision in Branam vs Provo School District, 780 P. 2d 810 
(Utah Supreme Court 1989), in which this Court wrote: 
In the present case, the district certainly does 
not fall within the intendment of the statute. It was 
not charged with the responsibility to deal with flood 
waters or to construct flood or storm systems, and the 
school did not act to protect the public at large from 
flood waters. Its actions were indistinguishable from 
those any other landowner might have taken to protect 
its property. As such, it enjoys no immunity from 
Branam's suit under section 63-30-3 of the Code. 
780 P.2d at 813. Emphasis added. 
Similar results are found in this Court's decision in 
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Sanford vs University of Utah, 488 P. 2d 741, 26 Utah 2d 285 
(1971) [claims for "nuisance" injuries to neighbor NOT immunized 
under Governmental Immunity Act]. 
II 
THE ROUTINE HANDLING AND DISPOSAL OF "DOMESTIC SEWAGE" 
AND ITS CONSTITUENTS, INCLUDING HYDROGEN SULFIDE GAS, 
DOES NO ENCOMPASS HANDLING "HAZARDOUS WASTE" OR 
"HAZARDOUS MATERIALS" AS CONTEMPLATED BY 
THE UTAH GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT 
If the Court adopts the common-sense, limited reading and 
application of the "governmental immunity" as per Williams, 
Standford and Branam, discussed in Point I, above, the Court need 
not engage in the "daisy-chain" analysis advocated by the 
Defendant DISTRICT. 
The arguments of the Defendant SCHOOL DISTRICT [that 
Subsection 63-30-10(18) retains "immunity" against suit for 
Section 8 ("dangerous condition of structures") AND for Section 
9 ("defective public building or structure") BUT NOT for Section 
10.5 ("inverse condemnation") claims] are jurisprudentially 
correct ONLY IF the DISTRICT was actually engaged in handling 
"hazardous wastes" or "hazardous materials". Thus, the first step 
in ascertaining whether the Defendant DISTRICT is "immune" from 
suit is to determine whether or not the "hydrogen sulfide" is 
EITHER (1) a "hazardous material" OR (2) a "hazardous waste". 
At the outset the Court should keep in mind that in the 
context of the "public health" and "environmental protection 
statutes", there is an intentional and consistent "ranking" of 
the described "wastes" and "materials". This "ranking" as 
evidenced by the type and depth of the statutory and 
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administrative controls and the imposed penalties for the 
violation of the regulatory scheme is generally as follows: 
1. unregulated "wastes" 
2. "solid wastes" [i.e. regular landfill-type wastes] 
3. "hazardous wastes" ["solid wastes" which, for some 
identified reason, are particularly "hazardous": e.g. 
asbestos-laden construction debris, which requires 
specially permitted and constructed designated landfill 
disposal, etc.] 
4. "hazardous materials" [not per se "wastes", but 
intentionally-created and controlled "materials", which 
are truly hazardous: the discharge of such materials 
into the environment brings out the "haz mat response 
teams" with their "space suits", "kitty litter", and so 
forth!] 
5. "toxic wastes" and "toxic substances" [the truly 
deadly stuff] 
A careful analysis of the pertinent statutes and administrative 
regulations evidences a clear legislative intent that the 
"hydrogen sulfide" gas, as a naturally-occurring by-product of 
putrification within "domestic sewage" falls within the 
unregulated "wastes" [#1 in the listing], rather than at the #4 
level as the DISTRICT asserts. 
A 
HYDROGEN SULFIDE GAS, AS A NATURALLY-OCCURRING 
BY-PRODUCT OF THE PURIFICATION OF "DOMESTIC SEWAGE" 
IN RELATIVELY SMALL QUANTITIES, IS NOT A 
"HAZARDOUS WASTE" FOR WHICH IMMUNITY ATTACHES 
The term "hazardous waste" is NOT DEFINED within the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act. Thus, it is perhaps instructive and 
helpful but not necessarily controlling for the Court to 
consider other statutory definitions of the phrase. The phrase 
"hazardous waste" IS DEFINED within Section 19-6-102, entitled 
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"Definitions", as part of the "Solid and Hazardous Waste Act" of 
Utah, as follows: 
(9) "Hazardous waste" means a solid waste or 
combination of solid wastes other than household waste 
which, because of its quantity, concentration, or 
physical, chemical, or infectious characteristics may 
cause or significantly increase serious irreversible or 
incapacitating reversible illness or may pose a 
substantial present or potential hazard to human health 
or the environment when improperly treated, stored, 
transported, disposed of, or otherwise managed. 
Emphasis added. Thus, for the "hydrogen sulfide" gas to be a 
"hazardous waste", it must be a "solid waste", which is "defined" 
in Subsection 19-6-102(17), as follows: 
(17)(a) "Solid waste" means any garbage, refuse, 
sludge, including sludge from a waste treatment plan, 
water supply treatment plant, or air pollution control 
facility, or other discarded material, including solid, 
liquid, semi-solid, or contained gaseous material 
resulting from industrial, commercial, mining, or 
agricultural operations and from community activities 
but does not include solid or dissolved materials in 
domestic sewage or in irrigation return flows or 
discharges for which a permit is required under Title 
19, Chapter 5, Water Quality Act, or under the Water 
Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C., Section 1251 et seq. 
Emphasis added. The first point of analysis would be to determine 
if the "hydrogen sulfide" (as a "gaseous material") is a "solid". 
It isn't! That conclusion should truncate any further need for 
analysis. 
Continuing with the statutory analysis, the gaseous material 
is a "solid or dissolved materials in domestic sewage". The 
phrase "domestic sewage" defines and describes the routine 
sanitary sewer discharges from the Riverton Elementary School 
consisting entirely of human wastes from the school restroom 
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facilities (sinks and toilets), drinking fountains, and/or the 
water discharges from food-preparation activities conducted 
within the school cafeteria. The phrase "domestic sewage" is not 
so "defined", so the Court must arrive at a point wherein the 
commonly-accepted meaning of common words must be utilized in the 
statutory construction. [Note, however, that the phrase "domestic 
sewage" IS DEFINED by administrative regulation as described 
below so as to NOT be a "solid waste", so it (the domestic 
sewage) could NOT be a "hazardous waste".] 
Section 19-6-502, as "definitions" for the "Solid Waste 
Management Act", provides in relevant part: 
19-6-502. Definitions. 
As used in this part: 
(7) "Solid waste" means all putrescible and 
nonputrescible materials or substances 
discarded or rejected as being spent, 
useless, worthless, or in excess to the 
owner's needs at the time of discard or 
rejection, including garbage, refuse, 
industrial and commercial waste, sludges 
from air or water control facilities, 
rubbish, ashes, contained gaseous material, 
incinerator residue, demolition, and 
construction debris, discarded automobiles 
and offal, but not including sewage and 
other highly diluted water carried materials 
or substances and those in gaseous form. 
Emphasis added. It is obvious that the Legislature does not 
believe or intend that "sewage" and or wastes "in gaseous form" 
be characterized as "solid wastes". The "bottom line" is that the 
statutory definition specifically EXCLUDES "domestic sewage" from 
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the "definition" of "hazardous waste". SUCH SHOULD END THE 
DISCUSSION! 
The Riverton Elementary School sanitary sewer discharges, 
including the "gaseous material" in the form of the hydrogen 
sulfide ("rotten egg") gas, are contained within and contemplated 
by the phrase "domestic sewage" and thus, "hydrogen sulfide" gas 
from this type of activity (i.e. operation of the public school) 
IS NOT a "hazardous waste" within the meaning of state statutes, 
including Section 63-30-10 (18) (c) of the Immunity Act. 
The Plaintiffs' interpretation (that the hydrogen sulfide 
is NOT "hazardous waste") is further bolstered by the 
administrative agency regulations adopted pursuant to statutory 
authority [Section 19-6-106, Utah Code] and for the purpose of 
implementing and enforcing those regulatory functions. 
Administrative Regulation R315-1-1, pertaining to "Utah Hazardous 
Waste Definitions and References", incorporates for the 
purposes of the "administrative regulations" the statutory 
definitions contained in Sections 19-6-102, Utah Code. The 
administrative regulations EXCLUDE "domestic sewage" from being 
a "solid waste", which thus precludes those materials from being 
a "hazardous waste", by providing in relevant part: 
R315-2-4. Exclusions. 
(a) MATERIALS WHICH ARE NOT SOLID WASTES. 
The following materials are not solid wastes for the 
purposes of this rule: 
(1) Domestic sewage or any mixture of 
domestic sewage and other wastes that passes 
through a sewer system to a publicly-owned 
treatment works for treatment. "Domestic 
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sewage" means untreated sanitary wastes that 
pass through a sewer system. 
Emphasis added. The Riverton Elementary School sanitary sewer 
wastes at issue in this litigation are "untreated sanitary wastes 
that pass through a sewer system", per the second sentence of the 
"definition". Thus, working backwards, the "domestic sewage" is 
not a "solid waste" and thus it is NOT a "hazardous waste". For 
sure, the hydrogen sulfide gases within the sewer line whether 
those gases are in fact a constituent part of the liquid sewer 
effluent or not are, in fact and in law, "untreated sanitary 
wastes that pass through a sewer system". End of discussion! 
The Defendant DISTRICT asserts [page 30 of APPELLEE'S BRIEF] 
that the Plaintiffs 
"ignore the plain language of the hazardous waste 
definition in 40 C.F.R. §261.3(a)(2)(ii). 
Defendant's rhetoric has several flaws. These are disclosed by a 
careful examination of the text of the federal regulation, which 
provides, in pertinent part: 
261.3 Definition of hazardous waste. 
(a) A solid waste, as defined in §261.2, is a hazardous 
waste if: 
(1) It is not excluded from regulation as a 
hazardous waste under §261.4(b); 
and 
(2) It meets any of the following criteria: 
(ii) It is listed in subpart D of 
this part and has not been 
excluded from the lists under 
subpart D of this part under 
§260.20 and 260.22 of this 
Chapter. 
Emphasis added. 
The first flaw in Defendant's assertion is the self-serving 
OMISSION of subparagraph (1) from the analysis: subparagraph (1) 
must be included, due to the word "and" (as distinguished from 
the word "or") between the two subparagraphs. 
But the fatal flaw of Defendant's assertion is its failure 
to examine the provisions of §262.4(a), which provides: 
§261.4 Exclusions. 
(a) Materials which are not solid wastes. The 
following materials are not solid wastes for the 
purposes of this part: 
(1)(i) Domestic sewage; and 
(ii) Any mixture of domestic sewage and 
other wastes that passes through a sewer 
system to a publicly-owned treatment works 
for treatment. "Domestic sewage" means 
untreated sanitary wastes that pass through 
a sewer system. 
Emphasis added. 
The Defendant has conveniently ignored the provisions of the 
controlling regulation! The Defendant DISTRICT might argue that 
the provisions of §261.4(a) are not expressly incorporated into 
the provisions of §261.3 [Definition of hazardous waste], and 
thus are inapplicable to §261.3. WRONG! WRONG! Section 261.4(a) 
IS APPLICABLE. First, because the provision is there, "in the 
book, on the page"! A mere quarter-inch away from the provisions 
of Section 261.3. Secondly, the provisions of Section 261.4 
expressly provide "for the purposes of this part", thus 
expressing an all-encompassing "definition" (or modification 
thereof) for the entire "Part" of the federal regulation: namely, 
§§261.1, 261.2, 261.3, and so forth! Federal regulations of a 
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technical nature are hard enough to read and understand as 
written, without requiring them to contain every "exception" and 
every "exemption" in the exact same grammatical sentence to which 
they obviously refer! Defendant's narrow and self-serving 
selection of text is misplaced and erroneous! 
In similar vein, Defendant's assertion that the mere LISTING 
of "hydrogen sulfide" within 40 C.F.R. §261.33 is similarly 
incorrect and out-of-context! This inappropriateness is 
illustrated by a careful reading of the federal regulation, as 
follows: 
§261.33 Discarded commercial chemical products, off-
specification species, container residues, and spill 
residues thereof. 
The following materials or items are hazardous wastes 
if and when they are discarded or intended to be 
discarded as described in §261.2(a) (2) (i) , when they 
are mixed with waste oil or used oil or other material 
and applied to the land for dust suppression or road 
treatment, when they are otherwise applied to the land 
in lieu of their original intended use or when they are 
contained in products that are applied to the land 
when, in lieu of their original intended use, they are 
produced for use as (or as a component of) a fuel, 
distributed for use as a fuel, or burned as a fuel. 
(f) The commercial chemical products, manufacturing 
chemical intermediates, or of f-specification commercial 
chemical products referred to in paragraphs (a) through 
(d) of this section, are identified as toxic wastes 
(T) , unless otherwise designated and are subject to the 
small quantity generator exclusion defined in §261.5 (a) 
and (g) . These wastes and their corresponding EPA 
Hazardous Waste Numbers are: 
U-135 7783-06-4 Hydrogen sulfide H2S 
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Emphasis added. That "hydrogen sulfide" is so LISTED does not 
mean that is a "hazardous waste". To the contrary! The "listing" 
is grossly out-of-context.x 
The "listing" of hydrogen sulfide in Appendix VIII following 
the narrative provisions of 40 C.F.R. §261 is similarly 
misanalyzed by the Defendant. Appendix VIII of 40 C.F.R. §261, by 
its own terms, is devoid of any explanation of what the pages-
long "appendix" even is, other than its title "hazardous 
constituents". There are but two brief references both 
contained in 40 C.F.R. §261.2 (d) as to what is intended by 
Appendix VIII. Subsection 2 61.2(d)(3) THE only reference which 
is significant shows the inappropriateness of the DISTRICT'S 
xThe inappropriateness of the DISTRICT'S reliance upon and 
analysis of 40 C.F.R. §261.33 is further illustrated by the 
"comment" actually included within the text of the federal 
regulation, as follows: 
[Comment: The phrase "commercial chemical product or 
manufacturing chemical intermediate having the generic 
name listed in . . ." refers to a chemical substance 
which is manufactured or formulated for commercial or 
manufacturing use which consists of commercially pure 
grade of the chemical, any technical grades of the 
chemical that are produced or marketed, and all 
formulations in which the chemical is the sole active 
ingredient. It does not refer to a material, such as a 
manufacturing process waste, that contain any of the 
substances listed in paragraph (e) or (f) . Where a 
manufacturing process waste is deemed to be a hazardous 
waste because it contains a substance listed in paragraph 
(e) or (f), such waste will be listed in either §261.31 
or §261.32 or will be identified as a hazardous waste by 
the characteristics set forth in subpart C of this part.] 
Emphasis added. Obviously, 40 C.F.R. §261.33 is concerned with 
"commercially pure grades" of the chemical, "produced or marketed", 
etc. Obviously, the "sewer gas" vented from the sewer line lateral 
of the Riverton Elementary School, even if such might contain 
"hydrogen sulfide" gas, is something other than what the federal 
regulation is concerned with. 
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f T c o u c M n. UOIX/IPR 
assertions, by providing: 
(3) The Administrator will use the following criteria 
to add wastes to that list: 
(i) (A) The materials are ordinarily 
disposed of, burned, or incinerated; or 
(B) The materials contain toxic 
constituents listed in appendix VIII of part 
261 and these constituents are not 
ordinarily found in raw materials or 
products for which the materials substitute 
(or are found in raw materials or products 
in small concentrations) and are not used or 
reused during the recycling process; and 
(ii) The material may pose a substantial hazard to 
human health and the environment when recycled. 
Emphasis added. Obviously, Appendix VIII to Part 261 of 40 C.F.R. 
has been relied upon by the DISTRICT in an extreme out-of-context 
manner. The LISTING of "hydrogen sulfide" as a "hazardous 
constituent" has NO LEGAL SIGNIFICANCE to the situation-at-hand. 
The Defendant DISTRICT'S arguments [page 26 of APPELLEE'S 
BRIEF] that the hydrogen sulfide gas at issue is not "domestic 
sewage" (as "defined" in the UTAH STATUTES, the Utah 
administrative regulations, and even in the pertinent federal 
regulations) because the hydrogen sulfide is being pumped from 
the sewer lines BEFORE the gas reaches the sewage treatment 
facility BORDERS ON THE RIDICULOUS. The gas is being pumped FROM 
THE SANITARY SEWER LINE. The vent pipe is connected directly to 
the sanitary sewer line. The DISTRICT'S argument might have merit 
if the "vent pipe" were connected to the roof of the school and 
sucked air and/or odors DIRECTLY out of the rooms. But such is 
not the situation at hand. The hydrogen sulfide gases and who 
knows what other obnoxious and offensive other odors, vapors and 
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gases from other parts of the entire system are part of the 
"domestic sewage", as so defined. The obvious legislative intent-
--to EXCLUDE "domestic sewage" and its related constituent gases 
from the definition of "hazardous waste" cannot be overlooked 
in a rhetorical sleight-of-hand of such an absurd factual 
argument! 
The "bottom line" is that the Utah statutes, the Utah 
administrative regulations, AND the federal administrative 
regulations, uniformly and consistently, EXPRESSLY PROVIDE that 
"domestic sewage" is not "hazardous waste". If the "domestic 
sewage", by definition, is not a "hazardous waste", then its 
naturally-occurring constituent components including hydrogen 
sulfide gas, in relatively minute albeit offensive quantities 
cannot be a "hazardous waste" within the contemplation of those 
statutes and regulations! 
B 
SEWER LINE "HYDROGEN SULFIDE" GAS 
IS NOT A "HAZARDOUS MATERIAL" 
UNDER FEDERAL REGULATIONS 
Subsection 19-6-302 of the "Hazardous Substances Mitigation 
Act" of Utah defines "hazardous materials", by providing in 
relevant part: 
19-6-302. Definitions. 
As used in this part: 
(7) "Hazardous materials" means hazardous 
waste as defined in the Utah Hazardous Waste 
Management Regulations, PCBs, dioxin, 
asbestos, or a substance regulated under 42 
U.S.C., Section 6991(2), 
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Emphasis added. Although Section 19-6-302(7) "defines" the phrase 
"hazardous materials", the phrase "hazardous materials" IS NOT 
FURTHER EVEN MENTIONED within the remainder of the statutory 
provisions of Part 3 of Chapter 6 of Title 19. The phrase 
"hazardous materials" is nevertheless so "defined" to be one of 
the following items: 
1. a "hazardous waste" as defined in the Utah 
Hazardous Waste Management Regulations; 
2. a PCB; 
3. dioxin; 
4. asbestos; or 
5. a substance regulated under 42 U.S.C., Section 
6991(2). 
Emphasis added. 
The analysis shown above evidences that the hydrogen sulfide 
IS NOT a "hazardous waste as defined in the Utah Hazardous Waste 
Management Regulations". The DISTRICT does claim that the 
"hydrogen sulfide" is "a substance regulated under 42 U.S.C., 
Section 6991." In analyzing the meaning of the federal statutes, 
one must first consider what the Utah Legislature had in mind 
when it utilized the words "a substance regulated under 42 
U.S.C., Section 6991(2)" . 
In the instant situation, there is NO FACTUAL "regulation" 
of the hydrogen sulfide "vented" by the District from its sewer 
line at the Riverton Elementary School! In this context, the Utah 
Legislature utilized the word "regulated" as contrasted with 
the word "defined". The wording "regulated under" connotes a 
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FACTUAL REGULATION. 
The DISTRICT acknowledges [page 21 of APPELLEE7S BRIEF] that 
42 U.S.C. §6991 applies to "underground storage tank" regulation. 
Thus, the first question to be answered is whether the 
Legislature intended for governmental immunity purposes to 
truncate the analysis, or would be inclined to go further in the 
"daisy chain" arguments advanced by Defendant DISTRICT. 
Hydrogen sulfide as a "hazardous" air pollutant 
The Defendant DISTRICT asserts [p. 22 of its BRIEF] that 
hydrogen sulfide 
. . . is listed as a hazardous air pollutant in Section 
112 of the Clean Air Act, codified at 42 U.S.C. §7412. 
In subsection (r) of this section, which addresses the 
prevention of accidental releases of "any substance 
listed pursuant to paragraph (3) or any other extremely 
hazardous substance," paragraph (3) directs the 
Administrator to promulgate a list of hazardous 
substances, and expressly directs that "[t]the initial 
list shall include . . . hydrogen sulfide. . ."42 
U.S.C. §7412(r) (1), (r) (3) (emphasis added) . Therefore, 
hydrogen sulfide is specifically identified as a 
hazardous air pollutant in this section, and it is 
therefore a hazardous substance under 42 U.S.C. 
§9601(14) , and is as a matter of law a hazardous 
material under Utah Code Ann. §19-6-302(7). 
APPELLEE'S BRIEF, page 22. Emphasis added. 
IF the Clean Air Act is, as indicated in the quoted text, 
concerned with the "prevention of accidental releases" of 
hydrogen sulfide and other "hazardous substances", it certainly 
is perplexing and counter-intuitive to believe that the Defendant 
DISTRICT'S actions in INTENTIONALLY AND CONTINUOUSLY RELEASING 
hydrogen sulfide into the atmosphere would not be the subject of 
regulatory oversight and prohibition! NO PERMIT! NO REGULATORY 
OVERSIGHT! The DISTRICT is simply "venting" the "hazardous 
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material" into the atmosphere! And then the DISTRICT claims 
"immunity" for the "nuisance" that activity is! 
The truth of the matter is that the Clean Air Act DOES NOT 
"list" hydrogen sulfide as an "hazardous substance". See Act of 
December 4, 1991, which DELETED "hydrogen sulfide" from the 
listing of "air pollutants" under 42 U.S.C. §7412.2 See 
ATTACHMENT 1 to this APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF. 
Opposing counsel has overlooked a significant amendment to 
the statute. In light of the CONGRESSIONAL REPEAL of any 
"listing" of hydrogen sulfide as a "hazardous air pollutant", AS 
A MATTER OF LAW hydrogen sulfide CANNOT NOW BE CHARACTERIZED AS 
A "HAZARDOUS MATERIAL", under the Clean Air Act and other federal 
statutes (at least for airborne discharges)! 
Hydrogen sulfide as a maritime pollutant 
Similarly, Defendant DISTRICT'S reliance upon the LISTING of 
hydrogen sulfide as a "hazardous substance" under the provisions 
of 40 C.F.R. §116.4 [contained as EXHIBIT 7 to APPELLEE'S BRIEF], 
as promulgated by the Environmental Protection Agency for the 
protection and purity of the nations maritime (oceanic) waters, 
has no application here. Utah a "landlocked" state having no 
"oceanfront" and certainly no maritime waters or connection 
2Page 3 73 of the United States Code Service volume, current as 
of 1997, applicable to 42 U.S.C. § 7412, contains the following 
entry as part of the "legislative history" of §7412 of the Clean 
Air Act: 
1991. Act Dec. 4, 1991, insubsec. (b)(1), 
deleted "77 83 064 Hydrogen sulfide" from the 
list of pollutants. 
Emphasis added. See ATTACHMENT 1 to this APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF. 
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thereto cannot be concerned with these "maritime" pollutants, 
which undoubtedly pose great danger to those maritime waters and 
the plant and animal life therein. The airborne discharge of 
hydrogen sulfide gas by the DISTRICT has no application the 
maritime pollution regulations, "definitions" or listings! 
conclusion: 
That the Defendant, WITHOUT ANY KIND OF PERMIT OR 
RESTRICTION is apparently allowed, with apparent impunity, to 
discharge untold quantities of the claimed pollutant into the 
atmosphere, 24 hours a day, seven days a week in direct 
contradiction to the very statutes and regulations it relies upon 
as "authority" for "governmental immunity" purposes certainly 
brings into question the accuracy and validity of its legal 
position. 
In the instant situation, there is NO FACTUAL "regulation" 
of the hydrogen sulfide "vented" by the District from its sewer 
line, IN UNCONTROLLED QUANTITIES INTO THE ATMOSPHERE! In this 
context, 
The Utah Legislature utilized the word "regulated" in 
Section 19-6-302 as contrasted with the word "defined" in 
retaining "governmental immunity". It is suspect that the 
Legislature intended that a governmental entity (such as the 
Defendant DISTRICT), having no "statutory responsibility" for the 
"handling" of "hazardous materials", would grant "immunity" (i.e. 
the entity cannot be sued at all) for "negligently" handling 
those UNREGULATED "hazardous materials" simply "vented" in 
uncontrolled quantities INTO THE ATMOSPHERE! 
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The wording "regulated under" connotes a FACTUAL REGULATION. 
The hydrogen sulfide is not FACTUALLY "regulated". The "hydrogen 
sulfide" with which we are here dealing is not the same "hydrogen 
sulfide" as described to be a "commercial chemical product", 
applied "to the land", etc. The "hydrogen sulfide" gas, in 
relatively minute quantities within the "domestic sewage" from 
the Riverton Elementary School, are not and were not intended to 
be "discarded" as described in the federal regulations! The mere 
"listing" of the "hydrogen sulfide" chemical within a long 
"laundry list" enumeration of chemical substances does not make 
the Riverton Elementary School "hydrogen sulfide" a "hazardous 
material" or "hazardous waste", when the introductory text (and 
other regulations) obviously and expressly mandate a contrary 
conclusion. The FEDERAL REGULATIONS, as cited by the Defendant, 
DO NOT APPLY TO THE CASE AT HAND! The DISTRICT'S reliance upon 
the quoted regulations is inappropriate and misplaced. 
The Defendant's claimed "immunity" defense is an illusory 
argument, born of desperation and not deserving of judicial 
belief or application! The judgment of the District Court 
granting summary judgment must be overturned! 
Ill 
OTHER DISTRICT ARGUMENTS 
The DISTRICT'S arguments [page 15 of APPELLEE'S BRIEF] that 
the DISTRICT'S actions are merely following the mandate of state-
promulgated administrative regulations [for odor-free rooms 
within schools] are misplaced, for at least two reasons. First, 
a careful reading of the regulation [Rule R392-200-6(B) (2) (b)] 
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indicates the regulation applies to those "rooms from which 
obnoxious odors, vapors or fumes originate": the rest rooms, 
perhaps the cafeteria kitchens, the high school industrial arts 
room where welding and metal fabricating activities (in which 
odorous petroleum-based "cutting oils" might be used) are 
conducted, and even the high school "chemistry lab", in which 
"rotten egg gas" is intentionally produced as part of the 
educational instruction! The regulation requires the "room" be 
"mechanically vented to the outside of the building". In the 
instant situation, the DISTRICT wasn't venting the "room" or even 
the "building" at large which should have been separated from 
the sanitary sewer "lateral" (which was "vented") by an 
effective, water-filled P-trap which prevents the odors from the 
sewer line from entering the structure in the first instance! 
Unless the P-trap between the sanitary lateral connection and the 
building (and or the individual plumbing fixtures and drains 
therein) were completely dry so as to allow an unobstructed air 
passage from the room into the sewer line outside the building, 
it would be physically and mechanically impossible to 
"mechanically vent" the building in that manner: water-filled P-
trap prevents the passage of air directly from the building into 
the sewer lateral, and vice-versa. The motor-driven "venting" fan 
could run continuously, but would suck ONLY those gases and odors 
from the sewer lateral and perhaps the rest of the underground 
sewer lines! Such a misguided approach to the problem was 
destined for failure from the inception thereof, as evidenced by 
the DISTRICT'S ultimate temporary "closure" of the Elementary 
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School for several weeks (in February and March 1998) during 
which time the venting fan was continuously operation until the 
DISTRICT, facing a "temporary restraining order" hearing later 
that day, "capped" the "vent pipe". 
The DISTRICT does not deny committing the activities 
complained of. The DISTRICT, however, relies entirely on the 
"governmental immunity" allegedly afforded it under Section 63-
30-10(18) (c) ["handling, mitigating or regulating hazardous 
materials or hazardous wastes"] as a shield to Plaintiffs7 
"nuisance" claims. 
IV 
PLAINTIFF'S "INVERSE CONDEMNATION" CLAIMS 
The Defendant DISTRICT asserts that it is entitled to 
summary judgment because the Plaintiff did not object to 
counsel's statements that the Plaintiffs stated in their 
deposition their real property did not suffer a permanent 
diminishment of value. That's not true. The Plaintiffs did object 
to that characterization. 
The real question whether the summary judgment may stand is 
whether the Defendant has produced "affidavits" and other sworn 
testimony to show that there is no "genuine dispute as to 
material fact". The operative "factual" issues pertaining to the 
"taking" and the "damaging" of the private property even if 
there was not "permanent" damage (although Plaintiff's grass 
still has not grown back) are in genuine dispute and a not 
overcome by the self-serving statements of opposing counsel 
during oral argument. 
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In reviewing a summary judgment, the Supreme Court must 
evaluate the facts and all reasonable inferences fairly drawn 
therefrom in a light most favorable to the party opposing summary 
judgment. Guardian State Bank vs Humpherys, 762 P. 2d 1084, 1086 
(Utah 1988); Horgan vs Industrial Design Corporation, 657 P.2d 
751, 752 (Utah 1982) . 
As no evidence was actually before the Court at the "summary 
judgment hearing" on the "taking or damaging" issue, there was no 
basis for the Court to make any "findings" on that factually-
intensive issue! 
CONCLUSION 
The Defendant SCHOOL DISTRICT has no "statutory 
responsibility" to "handle" or "mitigate" the claimed "hazardous 
waste" or "hazardous materials". Thus, following the common-sense 
reading and application of the Governmental Immunity Act and its 
text utilized in Williams, Branam and Standford, the Court should 
rule simply that the Legislature did not intend to retain 
immunity for the handling everyday "domestic sewage", even if a 
small constituent part thereof might be "hydrogen sulfide" gas. 
As a matter of law, hydrogen sulfide is NOT a "hazardous 
waste", as defined by Utah statute, which expressly excludes 
"domestic sewage" from being "hazardous waste". Pertinent state 
and federal administrative regulations are consistent in that 
exclusion! 
Similarly, the "hydrogen sulfide" gas emanating from the 
sanitary sewer line is not a "hazardous material" under pertinent 
state statute and/or correlated federal statute or administrative 
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regulation. The federal regulations relied upon by the Defendant 
are, according to the express terminology of those regulations, 
inapplicable factually and legally to the case at bar! The mere 
presence of the compound hydrogen sulfide in an extensive LISTING 
does not mean that hydrogen sulfide is a "hazardous material", 
particularly when closer examination and reading of the 
introductory text evidences otherwise! 
Similarly, the District Court's ruling granting summary 
judgment on the "inverse condemnation" was erroneous. The facts 
with respect to the "damaging" or "taking" were in dispute. 
Plaintiff submitted no hard evidence (affidavits, etc.) to show 
otherwise. The trial court also erred in its application of the 
"immunity" to the "inverse condemnation" claims. 
The District Court decisions must be reversed and the case 
remanded for the jury trial on the merits. 
Respectfully submitted this 13th day of December, 2001. 
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ATTACHMENT 1 
Excerpt of 1997 volume of United States Code Service 
"legislative history" of 42 U.S.C. §7412 [Clean Air Act] 
showing DELETION of "hydrogen sulfide" from list of pollutants 
AIR P O L L U T I O N C O N T R O L 42 USCS § 7412 
finds that the technology to implement such standards is not available 
and the operation of such source is required for reasons of national 
security An exemption under this paragraph may be extended for one 
or more additional periods, each penod not to exceed two years The 
President shall make a report to Congress with respect to each exemp-
tion (or extension thereof) made under this paragraph 
"(d) State implementation and enforcement (1) Each State may develop 
and submit to the Administrator a procedure for implementing and 
enforcing emission standards for hazardous air pollutants for station-
ary sources located in such State If the Administrator finds the State 
procedure is adequate, he shall delegate to such State any authority 
he has under this Act to implement and enforce such standards 
(2) Nothing in this subsection shall prohibit the Administrator from 
enforcing any applicable emission standard under this section 
"(e) Design, equipment, work practice, and operational standards (1) 
For purposes of this section, if in the judgment of the Administrator, it 
is not feasible to prescribe or enforce an emission standard for control of 
a hazardous air pollutant or pollutants, he may instead promulgate a 
design, equipment, work practice, or operational standard, or combina-
tion thereof, which in his judgment is adequate to protect the public 
health from such pollutant or pollutants with an ample margin of safety 
In the event the Administrator promulgates a design or equipment stan-
dard under this subsection, he shall include as part of such standard such 
requirements as will assure the proper operation and maintenance of any 
such element of design or equipment 
"(2) For the purpose of this subsection, the phrase 'not feasible to 
prescribe or enforce an emission standard' means any situation in 
which the Administrator determines that (A) a hazardous pollutant 
or pollutants cannot be emitted through a conveyance designed and 
constructed to emit or capture such pollutant, or that any require-
ment for, or use of, such a conveyance would be inconsistent with any 
Federal, State, or local law, or (B) the application of measurement 
methodology to a particular class of sources is not practicable due to 
technological or economic limitations 
"(3) If after notice and opportunity for public hearing, any person 
establishes to the satisfaction of the Administrator that an alternative 
means of emission limitation will achieve a reduction in emissions of 
any air pollutant at least equivalent to the reduction in emissions of 
such air pollutant achieved under the requirements of paragraph (1), 
the Administrator shall permit the use of such alternative by the 
source for purposes of compliance with this section with respect to 
such pollutant 
"(4) Any standard promulgated under paragraph (1) shall be promul 
gated in terms of an emission standard whenever it becomes feasible 
to promulgate and enforce such standard in such terms 
"(5) Any design, equipment, work practice, or operational standard, 
or any combination thereof, described in this subsection shall be 
treated as an emission standard for purposes of the provisions of this 
Act (other than the provisions of this subsection) 
^ u I 1991. Act Dec 4, 1991, in subsec (b)(1), deleted 7783064 Hydrogen I i, j , 
TK^fe [ sulfide" from the list of pollutants I y^7 yFv 
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